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obligation. In these acknowledgements I want to express not debt-filled gratitude, but a 
joy and celebration of certain people for their contributions and companionship in the 
development of this work. First and foremost I would like to recognize my advisor, David 
Fredrickson, whose scholarly innovation and boldness of speech have engaged my 
intellect and nourished my academic exploration in profound ways. Other faculty 
members who have informed and transformed my thinking include my two thesis readers, 
Mary Hess and Sarah Henrich, as well as Guillermo Hansen and Gary Simpson. I have 
also found myself surrounded by wonderfully encouraging and inquisitive friends and 
colleagues, who have provided much support and meaningful conversation in the process 
of developing this thesis: Peter Bauck, Mariel Vinge, Jessi LeClear Vachta, and Sam 
Peterson-Perlman. Finally, it is a joy to name the friends who offered their faces for the 
photographs that constitute a portion of the exhibition. They continue to astound me with 
the depth of their beauty and otherness: Elise Tweeten, Mat Brutger, Gwen Paul, Alex 
Bouvier, Susie Voss, and Pat Boland. Lastly, I have been wonderfully blessed by the 
institution of Luther Seminary and the opportunity to study theology and create art that 
my time as a student and Resident Artist has afforded me. I hope and pray that the 
intersections between faith, philosophy, history, tradition, art, and innovation, continue to 
be growing edges that flourish and give life in this place. 
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ORIENTING THOUGHTS: ON MEANING AND STREAMS OF DISCOURSE 
As both an aspiring artist and theologian, meaning-making drives my pursuit of 
these two different disciplines. I am endlessly fascinated by the ways that individuals and 
communities create meaning, the images and ideas they use to orient our lives, and the 
language through which they name experience. Yet even more, I have become well 
attuned to the profound impact that these meanings and paradigms have on the way they 
orient their understanding of themselves, their interactions with others, and their actions 
collectively in society.  
In the process of doing art and theology, both endeavors in meaning making, I 
have felt a pull to step back and look at the process of how these discourses create 
meaning in the ways they structure thought and evoke images. This move of stepping 
back to analyze meaning and systems of understanding is a very philosophic one. 
Philosophy is thus a third discipline I am inviting into this discourse on meaning-making 
because it undergirds the entire system in the Western world. Despite its influence and 
focus on explicit discussion of meaning and systems, the history of philosophic discourse 
has become an invisible, embedded part of Western culture and society. To invite an 
conversation between philosophy, theology, and art is to look at the very values and 
assumptions that orient the ways cultural discourses ask questions about and seek to 
make sense of the human experience. Exploring the confluence of these disciplines is no 
small task, and I am admittedly working in broad strokes and with insufficient time and 
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space to do justice to the depth and complexity of the topic. Yet, the interplay of 
philosophy, theology, and art is too important to simply ignore or simplify despite its 
breadth. After all, what is at stake is the core of theological reflection itself: how 
individuals and communities create meaning and orient living. The texts—and I mean 
texts in the sense of semiotics, including both linguistic and visual signifiers—from 
which people draw meaning and understanding are of deep importance. I'm convinced 
that if theology wants to be a locus of liberation and life rather than oppression, it needs 
to look intentionally at its textual hermeneutics as it speaks meaning into the flux and 
fluidity of human experience.  
In my study of theology – of various images, structures, and paradigms for 
understanding the divine, the self, and the community/world, which orient the practice of 
religion – I have been astounded to discover the influence of philosophy in the Christian 
tradition. The way that theology asks and addresses the questions of divine/self/world and 
meaning has often worked from philosophy’s assumptions and structures, which have 
permeated Christian thought throughout its historical development. The history of 
connectivity between Christian theology and philosophic thinking came as a bit of 
surprise to me because today there is seemingly a chasm between theologians and 
philosophers. John Caputo, an anomaly as a scholar in both theology and philosophy, 
writes both to the religious and nonreligious audiences, apologizing to each for disrupting 
their assumptions.1 
There wasn’t always such a chasm between philosophy and religion. In fact, 
Christianity developed directly within the Greco-Roman culture of philosophy, in which 
                                                
1 John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion 
(Bloomington: Indiania University Press, 1997), xxvi. 
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there were often philosophers speaking on street corners, in the marketplace, and of 
course, in the agora. The New Testament itself holds together both the philosophical 
discourse of the Greco-Roman world and the theological discourse of early Christian 
communities – at times in creative tension and at times in syncretic conflation. There has 
been much recent scholarship focused on understanding Paul’s writings in light of his 
philosophic context. Abraham Malherbe’s scholarship on Paul argues that Paul was 
“thoroughly familiar with the traditions used by his philosophic contemporaries… [and] 
used the philosophic traditions with at least as much originality as his contemporaries 
did.”2 Paul was working within the paradigms of the Greco-Roman world but doing 
something quite different from that of the philosophical schools of the time, working 
creatively with but counter to the philosophic tradition. Malherbe also shows that the 
author of Luke-Acts situates the figure of Paul directly within the framework of 
philosophic discourse in the Greco-Roman world in the way that Paul is described and 
publically situated in giving his speeches.3 This New Testament author, Malherbe argues, 
intentionally does not depict the ways that Paul worked with and challenged the 
philosophic tradition, but rather fits him nicely within it, portraying him as a learned 
philosopher who makes the same kinds of claims and assumptions, in order to claim 
legitimacy in the Greco-Roman world.  
I am keenly interested in the way that philosophy is related to biblical thought, as 
the scriptures themselves are deeply theological and root theological discourse. The 
above example makes a critical point in this investigation: that biblical thought is not a 
                                                
2 Abraham Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 8. 
3 ""Not in a Corner": Early Christian Apologetic in Acts 26:26," in Paul and the Popular 
Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989). 
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unified, cohesive whole. As much as theological discourse often refers to the “biblical 
narrative” as if it were a seamless entity and “systematic theology,” as if it were a highly 
organized, synthesized endeavor, they are both in fact characterized by a cacophony of 
voices. Amidst the multiplicity of voices, there are many images, stories, and ultimately, 
ways of making meaning.  
 Given the creative tension and syncretistic conflation of western philosophy and 
Christian thought throughout history, there continue to be ways in which these meeting 
points are both oppressive and liberative.  One of the ways to visit some of these 
intersections of western philosophy and postmodernism with biblical thought in all its 
multiplicity, is through exploring the images and ideas that emerge at these meeting 
points. Such analysis and deconstruction pushes against the confines and limitations of 
the ways that philosophy and theology make meaning and the implications of structures 
and images that orient understanding and action. In doing this I hope to offer a helpful 
critique of the ways systems of thought become oppressive and violent, a deeply running 
issue faced by the history of Christian theology. Yet, I also want to underscore the 
positive, liberative undercurrent of deconstruction, seeking to claim and explore 
postmodern images that explore the ambiguity, passion, welcome, play, and openness 
that are marginalized by Western thought yet have a beautiful confluence with biblical 
thought.  
In pursuing these deep questions, I draw most significantly from the work of John 
Caputo as he stands between theology in the Christian tradition and Western philosophy, 
offering an honest critique of their problematic intertwining. He does this simultaneously 
with a poetic biblical imagination and a keen eye toward the impact that systems of 
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thought and images have on our thinking and the way we act as society. It has been 
through the lens of Caputo’s writings, specifically The Weakness of God and The Prayers 
and Tears of Jacques Derrida that I have explored the images and structures of religion 
and philosophy’s troubled alliance and shared questions. Additionally, I draw also on the 
Derrida texts that Caputo is working with, delving into the words and images of one of 
the major thinkers of postmodern philosophy. 
Interestingly enough, the format of this thesis project is not too far removed in 
form and content from Derrida’s work Memoirs of the Blind, a work consisting of 
curating an art exhibition at the Louvre and a published dialogue on the themes that 
emerge from the works. I hope that a similar back-and-forth between image and text can 
emerge in my exploration of philosophic and biblical thought in this project. I will move 
through my analysis oriented by the various photographic art pieces that I have created, 
which themselves are a discourse on the very intersections that the writing explores. They 
will serve as images in both a literal and evocative sense, acting as both touchstones for 
moving through the different issues at hand as well as worlds of their own that evoke and 
explore meaning in a parallel wordless discourse.  
Finally, I want to recognize that even as I bend towards poststructuralism in these 
preliminary explorations of theology and philosophy, I have no pretense of escaping the 
very structures and paradigms of modernist and structuralist thought that I critique. I can 
only seek to follow the movement of postmodern thinkers: to work a little deconstruction 
to loosen the grip of the structures and systems that tend to close in, to provide a false 
security regardless of the violence it costs, and to create openings for the incomings and 
stirrings of the wholly other – the event stirring in the name of God, as Caputo would say. 
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It is in the poking and prodding, the imaging and imagining, the tears and trembling, that 
I am seeking to claim a theological conversation with postmodernism.  
If the heart of the Christian faith is love, justice, and hope as known and named 
through the language of God, Jesus, Sprit, then a serious consideration of how these 
values are upheld and expressed in theological thought is needed. For the very 
assumptions and structures of Western society that create and feed injustice also infiltrate 
the paradigms that the Christian tradition often uses to think theologically. In seeking 
honest theological discourse that longs hopefully for love that eclipses violence, justice in 
the face of oppression, and hope that opens that which is closed off, I think a bit of 
deconstruction is in order.  
7 
CHAPTER 2 
STRUCTURALISM: RUNNING INTO A BRICK WALL 
Here is where I will start: squarely within the frame (1). Within the perimeter of 
the frame’s four corners, I have placed three images that treat the very notions 
undergirding the function of the frame itself: bounded structures that systemize and 
enclose. This kind of understanding illustrates the structural assumptions, the “frame” so 
to speak, of Western thought. It is exactly this whole tradition of philosophy that 
postmodernism is resisting. Yet to appreciate what postmodernism is deconstructing, one 
must start with the structures themselves, within the frame. From the ancient Greeks 
through modern European philosophy, the goal of Western philosophy was to formulate 
systems for understanding the world, accumulating knowledge in certainty, and using the 
resulting structures of thought to orient the self and order society.1 The practice of 
philosophy in this history was and is an endeavor to reconcile the unsettling 
inconsistencies, instabilities, uncertainties, and fragmentation of human experience by 
proposing methods for reconciling them into a cohesive system.2 
Take Hegel as an example—a critical one at that. Hegel refers to his project explicitly as 
a “system,” and one that results in totality and certainty. Notice the words that Hegel 
emphasizes and the way they grasp at stability and concreteness. 
                                                
1 Mark Taylor, "Introduction: System . . . Structure . . . Difference . . . Other," in Deconstruction in 
Context: Literature and Philosophy, ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), 1-5. 





1. Exhibit Installation Detail 1 
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In my view, which can be justified only in the exposition of the system itself, 
everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but 
equally as Subject. At the same time, it is to be observed that substantiality 
embraces the universal, or the immediacy of knowledge itself, as well as that 
which is being or immediacy for knowledge.3 
Hegel here clearly articulates that his viewpoint can only be articulated through the 
systematic explanation of this system and all the concrete working of it and within it. 
Mark Taylor spells out some of the implications of giving preference to systems and 
totality over discreteness and difference in his analysis of Hegel. One is a need to make 
every phenomenon fit into the system so that nothing is lost or excluded. There must also 
be an acting subject, responsible for integrating everything into the totality of the system. 
Note also the implication that the end result closes off any doubt and uncertainty.  
According to Hegel’s notion of Aufhebeung, every loss is turned to profit, for that 
which is negated is also preserved as a necessary moment in the self-realization of 
the totality of which it is an integral member. By comprehending the logical 
interrelation of each moment in and member of absolute subjectivity, the 
philosopher re-collects and inwardizes the externality and exteriority of spatial 
(natural) and temporal (historical) dispersion in a systemic totality from which 
nothing is excluded… By developing the manifold implications of the philosophy 
of the subject, Hegel’s speculative system both constitutes the closure of the 
search for unity and identity that characterizes Western philosophy, and arrives at 
a form of certain knowledge that is supposed to overcome the doubt and 
uncertainty that occasioned Descartes’s inward turn.4 
Integral to the entire notion of system, as Hegel develops it, is absolute subjectivity and 
the necessity of the system to be all encompassing. Having reconciled all things into 
systematic totality of unity and certainty, the subject effectively comes to closure, unity, 
certainty, and stability. These characteristics point to the goal and nature of structuralism 
                                                
3 G. W. F. Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit," ibid., 70. 
4 Mark Taylor, "Introduction: System . . . Structure . . . Difference . . . Other," ibid., 9. 
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itself. That said, the idea of goal and end, or telos, is also a major point for Hegel. Take 
note of the very clear emphasis on such language in this excerpt.  
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that 
it is essentially a result, that only in the end is what it truly is; and that precisely in 
this consists its nature, vis. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of 
itself.5 
Hegel’s total system, his preoccupation with the whole, the movement to perfection, the 
certainty and concreteness of reality and substance, and the acting subject that reduces all 
things into self-unity, clearly reflects the major nodes of meaning and understanding that 
undergird Western thought. The same assumptions and points of understanding can be 
found among early philosophers in the Greco-Roman world. Take the Stoic school of 
philosophical thought for example, as Stoicism predominated in the philosophical 
discourse of the Roman Empire.6 
Aristotelians and, with particular zest, Stoics denied the existence of void in the 
cosmos… The Stoics believed that everything is body and there is no void.7 
The Stoics did not even believe that void could exist, seeing everything and necessarily a 
part of the entire system as understood in terms of “body.” Plutarch spells out more detail 
on this systematic conception of reality that values unity, cohesion, and substance, just as 
Hegel does but with much more emphasis on physics.  
The Stoics, while calling the four bodies—earth and water and air and fire—
primary elements, make some of them, I know not how, simple and pure and 
others composite and mixed, for they say that earth and water cohibit neither 
themselves nor other things but maintain their unity by virtue of participation in a 
pneumatic and fiery power, whereas air and fire because of their intensity are self-
                                                
5 G. W. F. Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit," ibid., 71. 
6 Abraham Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, a Greco-Roman Sourcebook (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1989), 12. 
7 David E. Fredrickson, "Ephesians and Stoic Physics," Word & World 22, no. 2 (2002): 145. 
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sustaining and to the former two, when blended with them, impart tension and 
permanence and substantiality.8 
Stoic thought turns on a total universe in which there is no void and no haphazard 
occurrences; everything is body, made of elements that act according to active and 
passive forces leading to cohesion, growth, permanence as well as burning consumption 
that assimilates air, water, and earth into fire.9 Built into the philosophic conception of 
the world is that physically and concretely there is not void or undecidability – every bit 
of reality is made of substance that creates a unified whole, permeated by the active force 
of Spirit. Yet even beyond the system of physics, there is a totalizing, self-subject 
focused undercurrent to Stoicism that echoes throughout Western thought. Epictetus, a 
predominant Stoic philosopher, has a strong orientation on the active subject in his 
discourses. Notice the similarity in his writing to Hegel on absolute subjectivity and telos. 
But one ought… to be able to be self-sufficient, to be able to commune with 
oneself; … so ought we also to be able to converse with ourselves, not to be in 
need of others, not to be at a loss for some way to spend our time; we ought to 
devote ourselves to the study of the divine governance, and of our relation to all 
other things; to consider how we used to act toward the things that happen to us, 
and how we act now; what the things are that still distress us; how these things too 
can be remedied or how removed; if any of these matters that I mentioned need to 
be brought to perfection, to perfect them in accordance with the principle of 
reason inherent in them.10 
It is the acting subject that seeks to understand the relation of the self to all other things, 
and acting within a concrete systematic framework to reconcile all things and bring them 
to perfection. The principles of reason and the relation of things constitute a system in 
                                                
8 Ibid., 150. (Original source: Plutarch, Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions 1085D.) 
9 Ibid., 147. 
10 Epictetus, Epictetus: Discourses, Books 3-4, the Encheiridion, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, trans. W. 




which the subject in full independence works towards the telos of self-presence. This 
looks a great deal like Hegel’s active subject and the closure of the system. 
In lieu of posing as an expert on the entirety of philosophic discourse—I am 
certainly not—I simply exposit these few fragments from my own foray into Western 
philosophy. All of these quotations point to the philosophic structures of a totalizing 
whole; all-bounding frameworks that encompass and systemize meaning and 
understanding. Let us return here to the idea of the frame, for a frame does a very similar 
thing: it encloses, defines, and orients. Kant discusses the frame in Critique of Judgment 
as that which distinguishes work from non-work, allowing the beauty of the artwork to 
stand on its own accord. Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s discussion points to the fact that the 
frame as Kant conceives it is necessary in its function of cordoning the work off from its 
surrounding context.11 The frame confines and therefore defines the work, protecting its 
purity as an object of beauty with intrinsic content. The frame is the point of closure, 
literally a structure that holds everything—the glass, the matte, the art piece—in place, as 
well as providing a visual structure for viewing the piece. Finally, it protects the work 
from the instability and contamination of the outside world, from anything that would 
threaten to infiltrate or confuse the meaning of the piece. Yet the frame is often hardly 
noticed, unless perhaps it is a particularly gaudy gold-encrusted thing found outside its 
typical museum gallery residence. Still, all its assumptions of boundedness underlie the 
very way we look at art; it is an example of how we pattern experience and 
understanding.  It is here, within the frame, in the face of the structuralism of philosophic 
thought, that I cannot help but see a brick wall. 
                                                
11 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 61, 63. 
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This first image placed within a frame, Structuralism (1), faces straight on the 
mass and force implicated in a structure itself, in this case a solid brick wall. The pattern 
of the wall and the pile of bricks stacked in front of it draw attention to its means of 
assimilating parts into a cohesive whole, filling the frame with concrete, stable, expansive 
patterns and planes. Within the bounded frame you cannot see any edges or endings, 
except where it meets its stable cement foundation—within this enclosed square the 
structure might as well extend and encompass the entire plane of its existence, ordering 
and stabilizing everything it contains. Not only is an expansive brick wall a bit bleak, it 
has simultaneously a quiet sadness to its austere security and an almost imperceptible 
frightening vulnerability that it tries to ignore. Notice the subtle relationships between the 
poetically poised bricks that have yet to be laid. They rest against one another, 
simultaneously balanced in their stacks, yet imbalanced and precarious, with spaces 
between and curvatures in their leanings, their weight not perfectly structured. While 
simply they are nothing more than bricks, there is poise and play in the interaction 
between these otherwise mundane objects. The dynamic interplay of weight and leaning 
creates a sense of relationship emerging between entities, one that evokes a sense of 
humanity. Viewed with metaphoric empathy, I see a deep melancholy in the assimilation 
of these bricks into the static, confining mass of the wall just behind them. When 
assimilated, all the dynamic interplay, the poetic relationality disappears into the austere, 
stable, predictable structure. It reduces everything to sameness. It embodies the dreams of 










Keep looking. As the eye continues to explore the image in all its structuralism, 
quiet threats to the structure begin to emerge. A small fissure in a seemingly assured firm 
foundation unsettles the base. The stability of rigidity is at once undermined by the fact 
that its inflexibility makes it unable to cope with the shifting earth, the chaos of the 
elements continually expanding, contracting, and in motion. A stain of sorts, 
unidentifiable in substance or origin upsets the monotonous shade of the wall in the upper 
right corner. The entirety of the structure and stability is undercut by the small cracks, the 
subtle wear from the elements, the feeling of unrest in knowing that the whole thing 
could, in fact, crumble.  
It may seem far-fetched but all of this—bricks, structures, and fissures—have 
everything to do with Christianity. Stanley Hauerwas, a well-known Christian ethicist, 
uses the very metaphor of laying brick to describe what the Christian identity and practice 
is all about—revealing his deep structuralist framework. In an article with a telling title, 
Discipleship as Craft, Church as a Disciplined Community, he uses bricklaying as an 
extended metaphor for a Christian understanding and practice.  
What I propose therefore, is to provide an account of what it means to learn a 
craft, to learn—for example—how to lay brick, in the hope that we may be able to 
claim forms of care and discipline unnoticed but nonetheless present in the 
church. 12 
Notice how the goal of Christian communities is oriented around creating a brick 
structure, and that such a discipline of structure and craft are how he sets up the frame in 
which one practices care, confession, and forgiveness. Notice the words he uses—telos, 
                                                
12 Stanley Hauerwas, "Discipleship as a Craft, Church as a Disciplined Community," Christian 
Century 108, no. 27 (1991): 883. 
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knowledge, truth, actualization, perfected, and necessity—that are all deeply embedded in 
the paradigms of Western philosophic thought, as we just explored. 
To lay brick you must be initiated into the crack of bricklaying by a master 
craftsman. … In order to be moral, to acquire knowledge about what is true and 
good, a person has to be made into a particular kind of person. … This 
transformation is like that of making oneself an apprentice to a master of a craft. 
Through such an apprenticeship we seek to acquire the intelligence and virtues 
necessary to become skilled practitioners. When the moral life is viewed through 
the analogy of the craft, we see why we need a teacher to actualize our potential… 
Of course, the teachers themselves derive their authority from a conception of 
perfected work that serves as the telos of that craft.13 
Hauerwas takes the same kind of language and imagery of the philosophic tradition and 
here applies it to his understanding of moral life and Christian community. The “moral 
life,” the life of faith according to Hauerwas, becomes a hierarchical, structural enterprise 
in how it is conceived and practiced. Just like the tradition of the philosophers, patriarchs, 
and rulers of the West, in this structural paradigm the Christian community has a clear 
telos toward perfection directed by those in positions of power and authority, founded on 
the clear and stable ideals of knowledge and truth. 
Equally important to understanding that a strong parallel exists between 
philosophic and ethical/theological/religious discourse, is unpacking the implications. 
Within this approach, people are not only the roles of master and apprentice, they are 
treated much like the bricks themselves—of need to be made into something, assimilated 
into the plan of the master builder. The apprentices function as recipient while the master 
is the active self, doing the teaching, forming, and actualizing. It also goes without saying 
that this structure is inherently hierarchical, furthermore it uplifts the philosophic 




dichotomy of active/passive rooted in Greco-Roman thought.14 The entire enterprise is 
also oriented around a structure of knowledge and virtue, which are necessarily learned; a 
determinative framework that needs to be applied by an active subject to achieve a 
perfected telos. Echoes of Hegel ring loud and clear as the massive face of a brick wall 
emerges as the embodiment of Christian tradition. I find it hard not to see this theological 
frame as running into a brick wall. Is it any wonder that Christianity forcibly converted 
and assimilated Native Americans into Western culture, killing those who refused? Is it 
shocking that Christianity is historically aligned with imperialism, colonization, and the 
deep violence embedded in these histories? The paradigms of structuralism and 
assimilation are inherently imbued with a certain violence, a closedness to the 
marginalized or different, with a tightly clenched fist around the security of sameness, 
order, and active subject. And yet these are the very paradigms from which much of 
Christian thought has drawn. 
 Let us continue with Hauerwas for a moment more, seeing where he ends up at 
the end of this exposition. He turns to soften the brick wall by evoking “story” and 
“narrative”—but look closely, as it has the same effect. 
It means we must learn the disciplines necessary to worship God. Worship, at 
least for Christians, is the activity to which all our skills are ordered. … As 
Christians, our worship is our morality, for it is in worship that we find ourselves 
engrafted into the story of God. … our lives can be recognized as lives only as we 
find ourselves constituted by a determinative narrative that has been given to 
us…15 
In other words, according to Hauerwas, in order to participate the Christian faith and have 
access to forgiveness and reconciliation without succumbing to the hierarchical structure 
                                                
14 Fredrickson, "Ephesians and Stoic Physics," 145. 
15 Hauerwas, "Discipleship as a Craft, Church as a Disciplined Community," 884. 
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that orders the craft of such practices and the closed. Not only that, but one must also 
submit to a determinate narrative structure, to be assimilated—“engrafted”—into the 
Western onto-theological metanarrative in order for one’s life to even be recognized as 
lives. Here, narrative becomes filled with manipulation and control over and against those 
who are at the bottom of the hierarchical structure.  
 It is exactly at the point of narrative where structuralism and biblical thought meet 
in Luke-Acts. As I noted earlier, some of the biblical voices have a strong alignment with 
Western philosophical thought. The author of Luke-Acts, henceforth referred to as 
“Luke” for simplicity, takes an approach not unlike that of Hauerwas, sharing 
philosophy’s proclivity for totalizing structure as distilled in narrative.  John Squires 
explores in-depth the distinctively Lukan theme of the “plan of God, ” his own version of 
“determinative narrative,” and the way it undergirds the entirety of the two-volume work 
of Luke-Acts.16 Like the philosophers of his day, Luke seeks to emphasize stability and 
clarity, overcoming doubt and uncertainty by organizing reality into a totalizing whole. 
He does this through the motif of divine plan. In serving as a totalizing narrative the 
notion of the plan of God underlies his claims to certainty, structural thought, and 
conflation with the Hellenistic conventions that were respected in his day. 
 Luke begins his Gospel narrative indicating his intentions in writing. Notice his 
emphasis on order and fulfillment, indicating the structural framework of his narrative. 
Since many have undertaken to set down an orderly account of the events that 
have been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed on to us by those who 
from the beginning were eyewitnesses and servants of the word, I too decided, 
after investigating everything carefully from the very first, to write an orderly 
                                                




account for you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the truth 
concerning the things about which you have been instructed. (Lk 1:1-4) 
This prologue clearly has a bit of a structural bent, as it accents careful ordering, truth, 
and instruction. Yet, it takes on more clearly a structural narrative function when read 
within the context of Hellenistic historiography, which it parallels quite closely. Take this 
excerpt from Diodorus Siculus as an example of this context. It is taken from his 
Bibliotheke Historike, his own attempt at writing a universal history. 
It is fitting that all men should ever accord great gratitude to those writers who 
have composed universal histories. Such historians have therein show themselves 
to be, as it were, minister of divine providence, for just as providence, having 
brought the orderly arrangement of the visible stars and the natures of men 
together into one common relationship, continually directs their courses through 
all eternity, apportioning to each that which falls to it by the direction of fate, so 
likewise the historians . . . have made of their treatises a single reckoning of past 
events and a common clearing-house of knowledge concerning them.17 
Reading Luke through this context, it is not difficult to see the way that his two volume 
work serves a similar purpose: an ordered history, told through narrative, in which all 
things fall into an ordered, divinely-directed whole. Writing out of his Hellenistic context 
and all its Western philosophical assumptions, Luke adopts the structurally programmatic 
role of providence in Hellenistic historiography to shape and orient the already existing 
narrative of the Christian gospel circulating in his time. Luke’s writing is one of the many 
voices within the cacophony of biblical thought that aligns with the Western philosophic 
systematic framework for understanding, making meaning, and orienting the self. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OTHER: STANDING AGAINST THE SYSTEM 
Standing out from the brick wall, standing against the system of structuralism, we meet a 
ghostly form of The Other (2), a form of organic, human curvature, juxtaposed with the 
rigid gridded pattern in the background. It is the other that sounds against the system of 
structuralism; it is the other that poses the problem, the spoke in the wheel. For it is the 
well-being, the humanity, and ultimately the life of the other that is at stake in all the 
systems and structuralism of orienting life and meaning. Let us return for a moment to 
some of the quotes from the structures of Western philosophic thought and see how the 
other is construed within a system that turns on assimilation and the active subject.  
 Returning to the quote from Epictetus representing ancient Western voices, let us 
examine how he deals with the question of the other. He certainly does not want to admit 
a dependence on the other. Yet even further, he fears the distress caused by being in 
relationship with the other. Epictetus begins the chapter in which this quote appears with 
reflections on the “forlorn state.” Such a state is that of a person who is without help of 
another or experiencing the grief of loosing another who one had cared about: “when we 
have lost a brother, or a son, or a friend with whom we have shared the same bed, we say 
that we have been left forlorn.”1 Read then how this threat of distress, of emotionality and  
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loss of relationship, impacts how one ought to behave with respect to the self and the 
other. 
 But one ought… to be able to be self-sufficient, to be able to commune with 
oneself; … so ought we also to be able to converse with ourselves, not to be in 
need of others, not to be at a loss for some way to spend our time; we ought to 
devote ourselves to the study of the divine governance, and of our relation to all 
other things; to consider how we used to act toward the things that happen to us, 
and how we act now; what the things are that still distress us; how these things too 
can be remedied or how removed; if any of these matters that I mentioned need to 
be brought to perfection, to perfect them in accordance with the principle of 
reason inherent in them.”2 
Epictetus here subtly argues that in order to achieve the security and peace of self-
presence and perfection, the other must be minimized; the threat of relationship curtailed. 
There is a resistance to the dependence forged in a mutual caring and the risk in forging 
an emotional bond that could be broken or lead to loss. The other effectively becomes 
another distress that ought to be “remedied” or “removed.” The ideal of the acting subject 
focused on a telos comes at a high cost, fostering a radical individualism and propensity 
for violence against the other. Indeed, in the face of Epictetus’ subject the other becomes 
nothing but a source of distress and object to be acted upon, an object reconciled into a 
system of certainty that protectively closes off the threat of dependence, risk, and loss. 
Here we see spelled out the implications of self-presence, stability, knowledge, the 
active/passive dichotomy, and a trajectory toward achieving perfection: a complete 
resistance of relationality and refusal to recognize the humanity of the other, turning 
instead to objectification. 
 These same themes and problems emerge in Hauerwas’ structural image of 
Christian practice as bricklaying. I discussed earlier, Hauerwas’ model is based on the 
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structure of craft that places certain leaders in positions of authority, acting subjects, 
charged with the moral development of those in their “care.” While Haurwas uses the 
image of master/apprentice, as I stated earlier, the other, the one outside the acting 
subject, is treated much like a brick itself: subsumed into the structure without regard for 
its self (its otherness) other than what it contributes to the system. Hear again this quote 
from Hauerwas with an ear toward this objectification of the other: the way that the 
active subject treats the other as an object of manipulation.  
To lay brick you must be initiated into the craft of bricklaying by a master 
craftsman. … In order to be moral, to acquire knowledge about what is true and 
good, a person has to be made into a particular kind of person. … This 
transformation is like that of making oneself an apprentice to a master of a craft. 
Through such an apprenticeship we seek to acquire the intelligence and virtues 
necessary to become skilled practitioners. When the moral life is viewed through 
the analogy of the craft, we see why we need a teacher to actualize our potential… 
Of course, the teachers themselves derive their authority from a conception of 
perfected work that serves as the telos of that craft.3 
Such a view of the other is of course couched in the metaphysical language of 
“actualization” and “perfected work” within the structure of telos, intelligence, 
knowledge, and virtue. Within this paradigm, the other in all their otherness poses a 
threat, a glitch in the system. This can easily be “remedied or removed” however, in the 
words of Epictetus, or “reconciled” in the words of Hegel. When one rejects the other’s 
otherness—their difference, their uniqueness, their inner value, their humanity—and sees 
them instead as another object that the active subject can act upon, then they are easily 
made into one more brick with which to build and support the structure. They are 
“engrafted” into the “determinate narrative,” and their lives are only recognized as lives 
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within the structuralist paradigm, to again use Hauerwas’ language. Structuralism is not a 
friendly place for the other. 
The Other (2) inhabits the tension being drawn between two very different 
paradigms of thought. On the one hand, the other stands out against the brick wall in stark 
juxtaposition to structuralism. Yet it also is a headless form, with an unsettling knob 
sticking out of its neck, a poor substitute. It evokes the lack of and the need for a human 
face. In order assimilate the other, to assimilate them into the existing structure, the other 
must loose their face, their uniqueness, their alterity. They are clearly still an other, but 
their otherness, their individuality and very humanity, has been diminished. In The Other, 
the other wants to speak, to be recognized, to stand out from the wall, yet it has 
experienced the violence of being denied a face. Its otherness has already been 
diminished. Like the pile of bricks in front of the wall, it is on the verge of being 
assimilated into the structure. Yet with its haunting form, its ghostlike stance floating out 
from the wall, it poses the question—the question of the other—to the ways of creating 
and structuring meaning. It is the ghost that haunts the thinking of philosophers. The 
Other in fact evokes many ghosts rising from the violence and bloodshed allied with 
structuralism. The question of the other hovers, haunts, and forces the question of 
otherness. The ghost of the other is the very immaterial substance of the unknown—that 
which is other than knowing, other than ourselves, other than materiality, which is indeed 
what makes ghosts so frightening.  
 In light of this haunting image, let us turn to postmodernism’s emphasis on the 
otherness, the alterity of the other. For while Western philosophy gets a bit spooked by 
the other, postmodern thinkers invite such a thrill. The question of the other is a focal 
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point in postmodern thought. In the process of deconstructing, in taking apart the 
systems, tapping them at weak points, blurring their clearly cut lines, upsetting their 
obsession with purity and categorization, one also liberates the other. Postmodernism 
seeks to free the other from the structuralist forces that constrain, marginalize, and violate 
the other in all their otherness. Yet if not as an object, or opposition to the self, or one 
that one can impose a structural framework upon, that how does one talk about the 
mysterious other? How does one approach such otherness that in its very nature cannot 
be fully understood or controlled? For Emmanuel Levinas, a postmodern philosopher of 
Jewish ancestry takes on this question as central to his writings. Taken from his work 
entitled “The Trace of the Other,” listen to how he positively, yet evocatively and 
mysteriously, speaks about the other. Keep an eye to the radical differences between the 
discourse in which he is writing and that of the Western philosophic tradition, with which 
we have been working thus far. Note also that “the alien being” is here interchangeable 
with “the other.”  
The alien being is as it were naturalized as soon as it commits itself with 
knowledge. In itself—and consequently elsewhere than in thought, other than it—
it does not have the wild barbarian character of alterity. It has a meaning. The 
being is propagated in infinite images which emanate from it; it dilates in a kind 
of ubiquity though the very plenitude of its alterity overflowed the mystery that 
harbors it, and pro-duces itself. Though it surprised the I, a being that is in truth 
does not alter the identity of the I. The obscurity from which it comes is promised 
to research. It thus opens a future whose night is but the opacity produced by the 
density of the superimposed transparencies. Memory brings back the past itself 
and puts it into this future in which research and historical interpretation wander.4  
Levinas’ writing here is much more fluid, mystical, and playful than that of the writers in 
the Western philosophical tradition I have quoted thus far. The first sentence of this 
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excerpt lays out directly that knowledge is not what is at interest here, in fact knowledge 
“naturalizes” the “alien,” that which is other. He then turns to talking about the otherness 
with language that is not about structure, hierarchy, control, and stability, but rather about 
emanating mystery, abundance, dissemination, and openness to the future without 
knowing or seeing what lies ahead. “Research and historical interpretation” are no longer 
divinely controlled, fixed, and oriented around concrete structures or total systems as in 
Epictetus, but rather they wander. These images are profoundly different from those of 
Western philosophic thought. The meaning-making in this discourse turns not on 
knowledge but on uncertainty and the otherness of the other.   
 How does this radically different discourse on the other come into dialogue with 
biblical voices? I find that within the polyphony of the Gospels, the Gospel of Mark 
seems to evoke a similar posture toward the other. Unlike the Gospel story of Luke-Acts, 
the other is not assimilated into a divinely directed determinative narrative. Rather 
Mark’s narrative is much more disjointed, episodic, and written in rough and abrupt 
language, quite unlike the seamless and eloquent telling of Luke in all its Hellenistic 
historicity. Yet even beyond the structure—or lack thereof—of its narrative form, Mark’s 
characters act decidedly in the alterity of otherness. Take for example the hemorrhaging 
woman, who in her disease reached out to touch the cloak of Jesus passing by, trusting 
that just that touch will make her well, which it does (Mk 5:27-29 NRSV)5. Turning to 
the passage itself, notice the way that Jesus responds to this other. 
Immediately aware that power had gone forth from him, Jesus turned around in 
the crowd and said, “Who touched my clothes? And his disciples said to him, 
“You see the crowd pressing in on you; how can you say, ‘Who touched me?’ ” 
He looked all around to see who had done it. But the woman, knowing what had 
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happened to her, came in fear and trembling, fell down before him, and told him 
the whole truth. He said to her, “Daughter, your faith has made you well; go in 
peace, and be healed of your disease.” (5:30-34) 
 
Here Jesus is surprised by the other! He is caught off guard, not knowing exactly what 
happened or who touched him. Levinas elsewhere has used an image similar to the drama 
of this biblical story: of the other coming from behind, taking one by surprise.6 Jesus’ 
response in his surprise is to listen, to invite the other to speak, and this woman in all her 
alterity and unexpectedness, tells her story—which Jesus affirms. 
Later on in Mark, Jesus is not only surprised but challenged by the otherness of 
another woman. This woman was a Syrophoenician, of Greek rather than Jewish 
heritage—certainly an other to the ethnic identity of Jesus. In their exchange, Jesus aligns 
himself with the structuralist mentality of assimilating Gentiles into the category of 
disrespect and distrust. He refuses to heal her daughter, replying “Let the children be fed 
first, for it is not fair to take the children’s food and throw it to the dogs” (7:27). Yet she 
challenges him, making her humanity and alterity known, standing out from and against 
the confines of the social system that confined and marginalized her: “Sir, even the dogs 
under the table eat the children’s crumbs,” she answers (7:28). Again Jesus is surprised, 
listens to her, and responds to her otherness, offering the healing that he first chose to 
deny (7:29-30).  
 Even more surprisingly about Mark however, is that these characters, in all their 
otherness, are not only recognized by Jesus but seem to have a profound affect on Jesus 
as well. This is not an explicit theme in the Gospel, but appears subtly in the movement 
between the beginning and end of Mark. For the Gospel of Mark seems to have two 
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major portions. The first half of the book is characterized by scene after scene of healing 
encounters and fragmented teachings, all in a hurried rush toward the second half, which 
is characterized by a slow, deliberate portrayal of Jesus’ arrest, trial, and crucifixion. 
Interestingly enough, the Jesus who seems filled with the power of working healings and 
miracles in the first half of the episodic narrative, ends up in the second half looking 
much more like those whom he was reaching out to heal. In the passion narrative Jesus is 
found vulnerable, marginalized, physically suffering, and rejected in his otherness, much 
like the minor characters he interacted with prior. Yet it is there in the event of the cross, 
that Jesus is recognized as king, and as God’s Son. Given the deliberation and focal 
attention that Mark gives to the crucifixion event, he seems to say that Jesus’ identity and 
significance is linked to cross, the point at which Jesus looks the most like those suffering 
others, and discloses his own wholly otherness.  
Read with an eye toward the other, the Gospel of Mark unfolds as follows. Jesus 
encounters and recognizes many nameless, marginalized, suffering others, who in turn 
are the ones (unlike the disciples) who catch a glimpse of who Jesus is in all his 
otherness—the character of the wholly other, of God. As the story unfolds, in the most 
climactic moments, Jesus begins to look less and less like a person of power and 
authority within the social, political, and religious systems. Rather, he begins to look 
increasingly more like those marginalized others, in all their suffering and in all their 
alterity that stands out from the social, religious, and political systems of the day. The 
story then ends abruptly, with a surprise, a ghostly angelic appearance, and an air of 
undecidability: the women who found the empty tomb run off in terror and amazement, 
saying nothing. The ending certainly lacks any kind of clarity or closure, a problem that 
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later editors of the gospel attempted to remedy, though this material is not original to the 
source.7 Mark’s kind of narrative imagery is one that is haunted by alterity, by the 
otherness of those in need whom Jesus encountered and by the otherness of God as 
experienced in the life of Jesus and event of the crucifixion. This is not the divinely 
ordained, Stoic sounding Spirit that directs and orders the determinate narrative of God in 
Luke-Acts. This spirit is a very holy ghost, the stirring of the wholly other, haunting the 
episodic, frantic, and fragmented telling of the gospel narrative in unexpected encounters.  
Mark is not alone in his orientation toward the other. Caputo draws deep 
connections between otherness and Christian theology as well. He draws not only from 
Levinas, but also on Derrida, who draws out the evocative idea that every other is wholly 
other, or in the French, tout autre est tout autre. He connects the otherness of the other to 
the otherness that we understand to be God—the divine, the wholly other, the numinous, 
the holy or any of its other names.  
The other, that is, God or no matter who, precisely, any singularity whatsoever, as 
soon as every other is wholly other (tout autre est tout autre). For the most 
difficult, indeed the impossible, dwells there: there where the other looses his 
name or is able to change it in order to become no matter what other.8 
Here the other is conceived not as a problem to the system, in need of assimilation, but as 
something wholly other, a singularity, an experience of the impossible—and as thus 
sharing the same characteristic of transcendence of the “I,” the same alterity, the same 
opening, as the name of God. Derrida continues, “one should say of no matter what or no 
matter whom what one says of God or some other thing.”9 There is a link between the 
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9 Ibid., 52. 
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name of God and the face of the other. This kind of connection is one that resists the 
ordering structuralism that assimilates the other in violence under the name of divine 
providence. Rather, the other and the wholly other are deeply interconnected, and are 
both easily divested of their alterity, closed in, and closed off by the totality of Western 




AN OPENING: A WINDOW AJAR, A GLIMPSE OF SKY 
Feeling the brick walls closing in, the oppressive weight of the structures that in their 
totality close off the possibility of something new or something other, I look for an 
opening in the structure. And I find it, An Opening (3), in a window ajar and a glimpse of 
sky. For those three squares of light reflected on the window, come from somewhere, 
outside the structures that fill and close the square window within the frame. The light is 
a reflection of the sky above; it is the point where the walls stop, opening to the sky 
above the courtyard. This subtle detail is no small matter – it challenges the very notion 
of what would otherwise be an all-encompassing and totalizing structure. It points to 
something other, something outside the system. Even as the walls close in, one can try to 
open a window. One can look expectantly, searching the panes of glass for a glimpse of 
sky.  
 This is what deconstruction is all about in the writings of Caputo. It is a hoping, a 
longing for an opening in the systems and structures that bend toward the violence of 
closure and assimilation. To challenge the assumptions of philosophic paradigms, to 
follow the fissures and push their structures to the points of breaking, rending, and 
opening, is to practice hope. For there would be no hope if everything were already fixed, 
determinate, and structured. If the story stops at the brick wall, if the closure of the 
system remains as secure and certain as metaphysics would have it, if the future is 
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there is a tragic loss at hand. Where is the humanity of the self and the other? Where is 
the good news—the gospel in all its newness and surprise? If the divine is construed as 
nothing other than that which orders, maintains, and directs reality, where is promise? 
Where are hope and faith if everything is certain, deterministic, and based in static 
knowledge?  
 Postmodernism’s deconstructive bent is not destructive as many often assume. 
Deconstruction is all about creating openings for the incoming of something new, of 
promise, of difference. It looks in fact, quite similar to the practice of faith.  Listen to the 
passion and hope in the way that Caputo approaches deconstruction. 
Deconstruction is so deeply and abidingly affirmative—of something new, of 
something coming—that it finally breaks out in a vast and sweeping amen, a great 
oui, oui—à l’impossible, in a great burst of passion for the impossible.1  
“The impossible” is a beautiful way of talking about that which is beyond the 
metaphysics of possibility, that which is other than the structural totalities that 
characterize Western thought. Caputo spends much of his time praying for, longing for, 
hoping for, inviting, calling, summoning the impossible, the incoming of the wholly 
other, the happening of the event stirring in the name of God—that which breaks open the 
structure and sameness. These positive themes in postmodernism I find to speak new life 
and meaning into the Christian paradigms of faith, love, hope, and justice that have been 
so often coopted and diminished by systems of western philosophic thought. The images 
or frameworks that one uses to create meaning and orient experience have a deeply 
important impact on the themes that the Christian tradition holds as central. The play and 
prodding of deconstruction can open up the discourse on meaning to an imaginative 
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exploration, one that invites difference, ignites a passion, and drives a longing—in hope 
and faith—for the impossible.  
 Caputo draws out the confluence of this approach with certain strains of biblical 
thought by creatively exploring the notions of the messianic, the apocalyptic, and the 
prophetic in Christian thought. He picks up and draws out these biblical themes because 
they involve a structural openness the to the future. In Derrida’s characteristically 
linguistic way, he writes continually about the future, l’avenir, with all of its extending 
and associated meanings: in-venir, venue, à-venir, aventure, é-venir. Caputo spells out 
these Derridian futural strands and associates them with a certain messianic pull.  
Deconstruction is engaged in and by the in-venire, the incoming, the arrival 
(venue), of what is coming, what is to come (à-venir), in and by the future 
(l’avenir) and the adventure (aventure) of the future… That is Derrida’s desire, 
the passion of Derrida or of deconstruction for the impossible, the unbelievable. 
For dreams and desires, prayers and passions, belong together in the overreaching, 
messianic and slightly Jewish expectant trespassing that deconstruction “is,” if it 
is.2 
 
All this longing and inviting of the future is not unlike the messianic stirrings that long 
for God to break into, break open the present horizons, a longing for something of God’s 
promise, God’s justice, the messiah, to come. After all, do we not continuously pray 
“Come, Lord Jesus?” in a messianic longing and hope? For Derrida and Caputo alike, 
such an invitation and longing, such an opening, a prayer perhaps, is the phrase viens!, 
come! It is almost a punctuation, though one not of closure but an end of continual 
openness, viens, oui, oui.  It becomes almost a meditation in its repetition throughout 
Caputo’s writing, a wash of continually confessing expectancy and longing.  
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 It is in this same vein of a futural focus and openness to the unknown that Caputo 
picks up on a certain apocalyptic tone of postmodern thinking as well. Though to be 
clear, not the kind of apocalypse associated with predicting the end time or being privy to 
a certain revelation of knowledge. Rather, he traces an apocalyptic undercurrent that is 
much more about anticipation and the arrival of something wholly other that disrupts all 
sense of normalcy—and the cataclysmic confusion that ensues. Deconstruction certainly 
seems to have a bit of an apocalyptic bent in this regard, opening the systems to 
disruption and confusion of all certainty, a breaking up and breaking open of the 
structures that bind the other, structures that try their best to close off the possibility of 
such an incoming.  
In taking such a turn away from Western thought and in speaking with a quasi-
messianic and apocalyptic tone, deconstruction is also a bit prophetic. Especially with 
respect to its concern for the other, its crying out against the deeply embedded violence 
done within the totalizing systems of Western philosophy, the voice of postmodern 
writings is nothing short of prophetic. Indeed, the prophets held nothing back in boldly 
naming the injustices of the systems of society in their day as they continually cried out 
for the incoming of God, the wholly other, longing and weeping for justice to come. This 
sounds strikingly similar to the side of Derrida found in his later, more personal writings. 
There we discover a philosopher who is a bit weepy, like Augustine, standing in a similar 
sort of fear and trembling as Kierkegaard, who gives us a more autobiographic glimpse of 
the longing and weeping that circumscribe all his deconstructionist writings. In Derrida’s 
final work, Circumfession, he writes with a quasi-prophetic/messianic/apocalyptic tone 
evocatively ringing out.  
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… you have spent your whole life 
inviting calling promising 
hoping sighing dreaming, 
convoking invoking provoking 
constituting engendering producing 
naming assigning demanding 
prescribing commanding sacrificing3 
Caputo calls this poetic excerpt “eighteen ways to pray and weep, to dream of the 
innumerable, to desire the promise of something unimaginable, to be impassioned by the 
impossible.”4 This is Caputo’s hypothesis of sorts, his underlying purpose in writing one 
of his books: to see the prayers and tears behind Derrida, and behind deconstruction in 
general. Caputo sees these prayers and tears as an invitation, a prayer, a meditation, and a 
critique, daring to dream of religion sans its destructive alliance with the concreteness 
and closedness of Western philosophic thought. Caputo sees the slightly hidden and 
anything but absolute and systematic spirituality of Derrida, who is “quite rightly called 
an atheist” and claimed by the secularists.5 He sees the prayers and weeping of this man 
who grew up a Jew in Algeria, who has a broken alliance with Judaism, yet who is 
continuously writing viens! and oui, oui, perhaps as prayer. In Circumfession Derrida 
confesses that his Hebrew name is Elijah, that he has this secret name of “Elie” known 
only in his family circles, a secret that he himself did not discover until later on.6 It is this 
secret, surprising side of Derrida in the identity of “Elie” and the name “Elijah” that 
further invites reading Derrida in a prophetic light. Derrida/Elie is in fact, one continually 
pointing to the future, writing with a quasi-messianic longing, inviting the tout autre with 
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the hope that the concrete structures and certain knowledge might fall apart in the quasi-
apocalyptic kind of event that deconstruction provokes.  
 Derrida, Caputo, and the discourse of deconstruction quite generally share a 
similar prophetic, messianic, and apocalyptic bent that emerge in the search for an 
opening, an inviting of something tout autre to upset the closure of the structuralism. 
Returning to An Opening (3), one sees this type of movement taking place. What at first 
appears as the walls of structuralism closing in holds also a glimpse of sky, perhaps an 
open window behind a screen, the square of light that points to something beyond. Such 
an opening in the photograph draws the eye up and out of the system that encloses, out of 
the bounds. From the bright square upward to the two above, the glimpse of sky reflected 
on the windows forms a visual path leading the viewer’s eye directly upward and out of 
the photo. As a good student of photography, I know full well that this is something 
photographers never want to do. My photography professor Meg Ojala would constantly 
be reminding our class to pay attention to the edges of the composition, making sure that 
there is nothing distracting that would draw the eye away from the subject or out of the 
frame. Part of editing photographs is keeping white away from the edge, for any white 
would disrupt the edge of print and blend into the white paper surrounding the photo. 
Such an error would be a blurring and distraction, threatening to draw the viewer’s eye 
out of the photo. But this is exactly what this photo wants to do – to offer an escape, a 
longing for sky, for an opening in the system, an exit from walls closing in. The glimpse 
is an opening up and out of the system. With the eye drawn out by some error of the 
structural bounds, we find ourselves in the white intermediary plane of the matte. Having 







 It may seem that we have returned to where we began: with image the frame. Yet 
this return to the beginning would serve only to reinforce the confining nature of the 
philosophic tradition that seeks to continually return to the beginning in a cyclical pattern 
closed off to newness and openness; such a move is nothing but a repetition of sameness, 
gathering and reconciling all difficulties, difference, and challenge into oneself along the 
way. Yet having thus far worked within with and pushed back against the structuralism 
that frame reinforces—against all the assumptions, traditions, and framework of Western 
philosophic thought—we return to the frame with a new understanding and 
deconstructive spirit. Such a return is not one of submitting to the structuralist paradigm 
of the frame, underscoring its significance, but coming back to the image of the frame 
itself to look for the fissures in the structure that we might trace. Here we can look for an 
opening of a different kind, one that would destabilize that which seems like quite a 
clear-cut enclosing boarder.  
It exactly this characteristic of the frame—its location at the boarder—that 
questions the frame’s identity in all its supposed concreteness, stability, and boundedness. 
As I discussed previously, Kant in Critique of Judgment writes about the frame and its 
role in confining and defining a work of art, acting as a stable boundary that cordons off 
the purity of the artwork from the surrounding context that threatens to infiltrate the 
meaning of the work. The frame intrigues Derrida because it is a boundary, an edge, and 
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according to Kant, an entity that seeks to enclose and stabilize. Yet Derrida’s analysis of 
Kant’s writing on the frame in The Truth in Painting pushes Kant’s conception to the 
wavering edge of stability. You see, Kant is fixated on making clear-cut distinctions 
about the central essence of the work of art, distinguishing between the ergon, the body 
proper of the work, and the parergon, that which is merely extra, exterior, and external to 
the proper field.7 Examples of parergon are the clothes of statues, the columns of 
buildings, and of course, the frame of paintings.8 While Kant makes such distinctions in 
order to secure the identity and stability of the frame, Derrida points out that the external 
boundary of the frame stands at fairly muddled crossroads in fact. The frame’s location at 
the edge, at the boundary, does not mark it as “detached but on the contrary [it is] more 
difficult to detach”9—it simultaneously is separate from the work but necessary to it in 
order to define and contain it. As the frame separates the the integral inside from the 
outside wall and context and “then, step by step, from the whole field of historical, 
economic, political inscription” of the wider context, the frame also lacks a stable identity 
in the in-between.10 It stands out against the grounds of each of these two planes—the 
work and its context—yet it belongs to each, both a part of the external setting of the 
work yet integral to the defining of the work itself, standing at the ground where the two 
merge and meld into one another.11 In this way the boundary seems to become muddied, 
destabilized, the frame at once held together and falling open. Its very identity of the 
                                                
7 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 56. 
8 Ibid., 57-63. 
9 Ibid., 59. 




clear border becomes a bit less clear, a bit more fragile and contradictory. This returning 
to the frame thus does not hold up a rigid all-encompassing image to give a framework 
and sense of conclusion the whole discussion, is not the origin and telos of a cyclical 
conversation, but rather draws us to the edge, to the border, where our understanding is 




COMING FACE TO FACE: IMAGES BEYOND BORDERS 
With the boundary open, all rigidity and boundedness thrown to the wind, we turn 
to a very different kind of discourse, one no longer about the frame or confined within the 
frame, but emerging in the flux of such a boundary falling open. No longer in the plane of 
straight lines, what had once seemed decidedly fixed becomes an ever receding horizon 
to be explored. Such a play of images, filled with openness and wavering undecidability, 
invites a discourse on seeing without seeing, light and blindness, a torn edge, and eyes 
filling with tears. You see, Postmodern thinkers not only respond to the structuralism of 
Western thought but to the undergirding language of austere writing that is allergic to the 
undecidability of pathos and poetry. There is no room for poetics or playfulness in the 
craft of bricklaying. Postmodern writing has its own characteristic style and imagery that 
practices the very values and paradigms about which it writes in the writing itself. 
Postmodern writing is not only about negative maneuvers in deconstructing the stark 
structures of Western thought, but doing so with a play of language and images that also 
claims its own positive imagination—drawing images and themes that I find positively 
captivating.  
Postmodernism burns with a passion for the impossible, exuding faintly 
glimmering flecks of fire, smoldering cinders that leave but a trace, embracing the 
darkness, and disseminating ashes on the wind, the wind of perhaps a certain ruach that is 
not fearful of the void but gently caresses the face of the deep. Wandering through these 
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images we find ourselves struck a little blind as Caputo would say, hands outstretched, 
groping in the obscurity, eyes seeing only through tears, bearing faces that come to face 
the other, confronted with transcendent mystery. All these images converge and play off 
one another in the series of traces and faces that make up the rest of the visual and textual 
exploration. Unlike the first three photographs that began this study, the images that 
appear in Face to Face: Fragments 1-5 (5, 8-10, 21) do not occur within a frame. They 
are unbounded and in fact, depend on a certain structural openness—on the negative 
space between the glass and the tear of the paper behind, on the interplay between lights 
and darkened glass, seen only through a bit of blindness. Don’t worry, I will explain. All 
of this will soon become clear. Or perhaps so clear that in a transparency it will open to 
the beyond and dissolve into uncertainty. Who knows. Je ne sais pas. On (ne pas) verra. 
We’ll see (or not). 
 Seeing is in fact one of the defining characteristics of the face: both the 
functionality of vision and the sense of identity that it shapes in rendering itself visible, 
that is the face not only sees but is seen. The face is the site of giving and receiving 
information, experience, and communication. The face is not only an indicator of a 
person’s identity but also of their thoughts and emotions, an accompanying text to 
language. We read faces constantly in our interactions, be they momentous or minute—
and we read them using the faculties of our own faces. Such a practice is quite routine 
and usually subconscious, though interestingly enough it was taken on with all the 
systematic structure and rigidity of Western thought by a second century Greek 
philosopher named Polemon. His work, Physiognomy, was a methodically produced 
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thought in his day and in its historical import shows that it continued to enjoy popularity 
and influence through the Medieval period.1 
Physiognomy is a fascinating work to read because it carefully, categorically, 
systematically goes through different physical characteristics in minute detail and various 
combinations, giving a one-to-one correspondence between these physical traits and 
character judgments. Polemon, a philosopher of traditional Western thought, clearly 
wants to take the face at face value. He seeks to apply a practical structure of meaning to 
obtain certain knowledge, subjecting the face to his assumptions of concreteness, 
predictability, and universals. This short excerpt is one tiny fragment from his extensive 
systematic work that gives a sense of the piece. Take this tiny fragment in conjunction 
with a chart compiled just on the characteristics of eyes drawn from the work by scholar 
and translator Robert Hoyland (4-5).2  
If you see that the eye closes evenly and has moisture, and it is large and clear, 
and the forehead is soft and slack, judge for him great modesty, good intentions, 
and knowledge. But if you see that the eye is dry, and it closes and remains so, 
then opens, assume for people with it boldness, evil intentions, and bravery. If 
you see, together with these signs, that the forehead is handsome, the eyebrows 
turn down, and the eyelids are rough, then associate with its owner fierce anger 
and an advanced state of evil. If you see that everything about the eye is soft, 
judge for it goodness without equal in other eyes.3 
 
While it seems silly and extreme to our contemporary and scientific ears, Polemon’s 
writings were not outside of the assumptions of readability, reliability, and structural  
                                                
1 Simon Swain, "Introduction," in Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from 
Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam, ed. Simon Swain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1-5. 
2 "Polemon's Physiognomy," in Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from 
Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 182-83. 















hierarchy that Western thought continues to value. Of course, we do not continue such 
extreme systematic physical readings of people today. Yet we do read faces in all their 
expressiveness as a screen of symbols, a visual text of disclosure—and we put a great 
deal of trust into these readings. We automatically take the signifiers we receive from the 
face at face value. And if we find those signs were deceitful, then we say that person who 
displayed such falsity immediately loses face.  
 Caputo writes about such ill-considered trust put into the readability and 
reliability of the face in his book Radical Hermeneutics. He resists the emphasis placed 
on concreteness and systemizing in a Western approach to looking at faces. Much more 
in line with Levinas’ mystical view, he points to the surprise, mystery, and uncertainty of 
the face. He quite evocatively paints the question at hand, as I see it. 
The face is a shadowy place, a flickering region where we cannot always trust our 
eyes. And my interest lies not in reducing this ambiguity but in exploiting it. 
There is a lot of what Derrida calls undecidability and dissemination written all 
over the face, which is a tricky place, full of ambiguous signals and conflicting 
messages. We speak of something being true or false “on its face” (super-faciem, 
sur-face), and that means in an entirely manifest way, with nothing hidden, left 
behind, concealed. But of course the human face is anything but that. It is, on the 
contrary, a hall of mirrors, a play of reflections, a place of dissemblance and 
dissimulation, sometimes a place which we manipulate in order to produce an 
effect, sometimes a place where the truth gets out of the bag on us against our 
will. Sometimes our face betrays us, and sometimes we give the lie to others by 
putting on a convincing face. The human face is anything but simple and 
unambiguous, anything but just surface. It is streaked with hidden depths and 
concealed motives.4 
 
The face is a screen of symbols that we can neither read with certainty nor project 
ourselves with certainty. The signs of the face are so many and complex that it cannot be 
subjected to a simple—though in Polemon’s case certainly not brief—formula to extract a  
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concrete meaning. It is an evocative, mysterious place, both in the other and even in the 
self. I know I am not alone in experiencing the unsettling shock of seeing one’s one facial 
expressions reflected back to me in a photograph, a mirror, or a video. One’s self-
representation does not directly correlate to what one thinks one exudes or even what one 
intended. There is so much dissemblance, much that is revealed and much that is 
concealed, a mix of truth and deceit, that obscures the face.  
 Such uncertainties and instabilities run counter to Western philosophy’s obsession 
with secure structure and sure knowledge. We would rather see the face, see the eye, see 
seeing itself, as an assured endeavor, one of illumination, communication, and disclosure, 
rather than an elusive withdrawing into the tumultuous state of undecidability. Simon 
Swains’ compilation of scholarly analysis on Polemon’s work Physiognomy is entitled 
Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul—reflective of Western assumptions about seeing and 
understanding. “The eyes are the gateway to the soul” is common saying even today, 
following in the tradition. Does not even the word “Enlightenment” itself assume a 
certain image of seeing associated with light and clarity? One becomes illuminated with 
knowledge, truth, and understanding as if the “essence” of these abstract certainties were 
revealed in a shining light, luminously emerging from the darkness of uncertainty. This is 
the image orienting the Western philosophic tradition. Derrida draws up two counter 
images—burning cinders and faces—that evoke blindness and run completely contrary to 
the assumptions and values of this philosophic tradition. 
 Derrida’s Cinders is a piece of writing that I found entirely captivating, leading 
me in fascination through a poetic textual summoning of images and voices. The book 
turns on the image/phrase il y a là cindres, invoked continuously throughout the text. It is 
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a fragment of language, an evocative image, treated as if it is its own character, 
something that just came upon Derrida, not that he invented, but that somehow has a life 
of its own.5 The phrase has a double meaning. Its translation there are cinders6, can either 
refer to the fact that there are cinders as opposed to an absence, or that there are cinders, 
referring to a place, over there not here, that is the place of the cinders. In this way, not 
just the nature of cinders themselves but also the double meaning of the phrase il y a là 
cindres, evokes a space between presence and absence, between being and nonbeing. 
Cinders are there, yet they are continually burning up. They are giving off light, yet lost 
in engulfing return of darkness after the fire. Cinders are there, yet they are not here, they 
are beyond; they are burning and scattering, carried off by the wind. They are vaguely 
present yet they point to the fire that has already past.  
The fire: what one cannot extinguish in this trace among others that is a cinder. 
Memory or oblivion, as you wish, but of the fire, trait that still relates to the 
burning. No doubt the fire has withdrawn, the conflagration has been subdued, but 
if there are cinders (il y a là cindres), it is because the fire remains in retreat… it 
disguises itself, beneath the multiplicity, the dust, the makeup powder, the 
insistent pharmakon of a plural body that no longer belongs to itself – not to 
remain nearby itself, not to belong to itself, there is the essence of the cinder, its 
cinder itself.7 
 
Cinders are but a disfigured remnant of an event, a trace, a memory, disseminated yet 
perhaps still smoldering, their very being withering way, here yet there, constantly in 
retreat, veiled with mystery.  
The French title of the book is similarly evocative. Feu la cindre is a phrase with 
a similar double meaning dependent on whether it is spoken or read. Spoken it sounds 
                                                
5 Jacques Derrida, Cinders, trans. Ned Lukacher (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 
31-33. 
6 Translation mine 
7 Derrida, Cinders, 61. (Translation modified) 
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like cinders were, as feu (fire) sounds like fût, the subjunctive imperfect tense of the verb 
être, “to be.” When read however, it translates to fire cinders, summoning the link 
between cinders and the fire that came before, the fire that fût, the fire that was. Such an 
image and its textual description play off such undecidability, mystery, and absenting 
presence, running counter to the stability and clarity associated with the enlightening 
light of Western thought. Hear this excerpt as well, which has an “ear for the flame”:  
I hear well, I hear it, for I still have an ear for the flame even if a cinder is silent, 
as if he burned paper at a distance, with a lens, a concentration of light as a result 
of seeing in order not to see, writing in the passion of non-knowledge rather than 
of the secret. I would say, for the protection and illustration of its own sentence, 
“I” the cinder would say that his (Derrida’s) writing is not interested in 
knowledge. The raw cinder, that is more to his taste.8 
 
Here the text written by Derrida is unsettlingly separated from Derrida himself, absenting 
from the first person the text speaks of Derrida’s tendencies to side with the unknown. 
Clearly writing against the thinking of enlightenment (in all the layered meaning of that 
word), Derrida does not get rid of the image of light but drastically re-images/imagines it 
by daring to “run the risk of a poem of the cinder.”9 
 The poetic image of cinders runs completely counter to the radiant beams of 
illuminating light that come to mind with “Enlightenment” or the Christian equivalent of 
“Light of the World.” Cinders are still a light, yet one that is dim and smoldering, 
threatening to fade and disappear at any moment, wavering in instability. Cinders will 
soon become nothing but ashes. Cinders don’t shed a light of understanding but one of 
confusion and scattering; their meaning is still there, yet over there, just out of reach, with 
certitude held under the erasure of the burning light of a fire. Yet as Caputo is quick to 
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point out, such an image kindles the imagination and ignites a burning passion for the 
impossible, for an opening and incoming, for a disruption of the confines of sameness 
that an all-illuminating stability has want to construct.  
 Derrida opens a similar discourse, one that also runs counter to seeing, by 
considering the pervasiveness of blindness. His work Memoirs of the Blind is written 
around a series of images—famous works of art compiled into exhibition at the Louvre, 
which Derrida himself curated. All these images are about notions of blindness that upset 
the Western obsession with sight: the witness of many blind men in the Bible, the 
blindness of drawing itself, and the blindness of eyes veiled with tears. Derrida 
mentioned in the work that his first thought for the title of the exhibition was L’ouvre où 
ne pas voir, The Open Where Not to See.10 The word for “open” in the original French 
title, l’ouvre, in its vocal pronunciation sounds like “Louvre,” the location of the 
exhibition and a place that is without a doubt a place for seeing. The word is also spelled 
similarly to the word œuvre, which refers to a body of artistic work. To argue that visual 
art turns on blindness would have been (and still is!) a bold and contrary claim to what 
one would assume arriving at the Louvre to look at numerous collections of art. Still, 
Derrida picks up instead on a counter-current within the great collection of the Louvre’s 
holdings—one that sketches out blindness. While Derrida chose instead Memoirs of the 
Blind as the title of the exhibition, as it emphasizing memory, history, and the inclusion 
of his own memoirs, I still find his first idea of a title to be quite evocative. It is this non-
title, this almost title that I adopted as my own. 
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 Derrida begins his analysis of art in Memoirs of the Blind with a series of 
drawings depicting biblical stories of blindness and healings, along with a couple of 
Coypel’s drawing that are isolated “studies” of blind men (indeed, in the literary tradition 
the blind characters are in fact almost always men). These paintings, the depictions of 
blind men and their healings, assume that blindness is a defect, an instability that upsets 
the established order. Derrida underlines this point of Western assumptions about 
blindness:  
Sin, fault, or error—the fall also means that blindness violates what could be here 
called Nature. It is an accident that interrupts the regular course of things or 
transgresses natural laws. It sometimes leads one to think that the affliction affects 
both Nature and a nature of the will, the will to know [savoir] as the will to see 
[voir] … Idein, eidos, idea: the whole history, the whole semantics of the 
European idea, in its Greek genealogy, as we know—as we see—relates seeing to 
knowing.11 
 
You see, the whole way language is formed around seeing, the very place of sight in the 
popular imagination and discourse of the Western world, is characterized by knowing. 
Thus, to not see, to hold the condition of blindness, either physically, metaphorically, 
rhetorically, or allegorically, is assumed to be either unnatural and thus tragic or the 
willingness of a bad will that chose to close one’s eyes.12 
Derrida picks up the assumptions of blindness in the tradition of Western thought 
and explores the very unnatural spaces of blindness. He notices in all the drawings of 
blindness that there is a fascinating study of blindness playing out in the artist’s 
representation of the hands of the blind, evoking particular characteristics of blindness. 
The hands are at times drawn back, drawn together in a pious prayer, depicting the blind 
                                                




as passive, the receiver of healing. Yet many representations depict quite active hands, 
after all, the reaching of one’s hands, or a cane extending from the hand, is characteristic 
of blindness. The hands of blind are often open in the drawings Derrida analyzes, 
“begging, praying, supplicating, imploring, praising,” to borrow his description.13 
Coypel’s drawings that are studies of blindness show even more dramatic representations 
of the hands of the blind—they are often foregrounded, reaching, fingers outstretched, 
straining forward, flexed in motion. The fingers outstretched trace the air, the hands feel 
and gesture; Derrida is very clear that these hands do something. In a sense, Derrida 
argues that these open, reaching hands go even beyond seeing, further than sight. It is not 
hard to see how Caputo picks up on such activity as that of faith, an unseeing that reaches 
out into the unknown, going into the beyond that is not associated with the paradigms of 
certainty and knowledge. There is a faithfulness, a hope, a passion that emerges from 
these extended hands, imploring, extending, making gestures of prayer and openness, 
reaching, touching, tracing, and courageously embracing the unknown, keeping on ahead, 
feeling one’s way… 
Such behavior of the hands, the extending out ahead of seeing and knowing, 
marks the characteristic of blindness that is not simply an unnatural exception but a 
condition that pervades our experience. How often one finds oneself reaching for 
something without looking, scribbling notes absently, groping blindly with eyes 
preoccupied elsewhere. I often find myself scribbling down notes onto sticky notes, 
hands reaching and imploring the ideas, obscured in the blindness of not yet knowing, not 
looking to see, or haphazardly jotting down a dream in the unseeing darkness of night, 
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still in the daze of half-sleep. The hands reaching, unseeing, tracing in blindness is, 
Derrida argues, the very condition of drawing itself—such an art that associated with the 
clarity and precision of sight. Yet one can never see both the subject/scene and the paper 
on which one draws at the same time; the eye is always turned to one, blind to the other. 
One holds the gap between these two visions in the trace of memory. Having explored 
drawn portrayals of blind men and the blindness of drawing itself, Derrida turns to the 
blindness of tears. We will turn a blind eye to this final image however, for just a 
moment, to invite the voices of biblical writings, which indeed have a great deal to say 
about blindness.  
 Rather than comparing two different pieces of biblical literature when it comes to 
seeing light and blindness, I want to look at two contrasting voices within one portion of 
biblical text: the Gospel of John. I find this Gospel to be quite interesting in fact that it 
holds together very different streams of thought and writing in its nature as a composition 
of sources. Most scholars agree that the author of the Gospel of John was working with 
several sources including one usually referred to as a “Signs Gospel” or “sign source.”14 
In my own careful reading of John’s Gospel, I notice these passages that refer to the 
miracles or “signs” that Jesus performs, and the general difference in tone between the 
passages portraying Jesus as the great worker of miracles and Jesus as the one who is in 
communion with his disciples. In chapter six, just after the feeding of the five thousand, 
Jesus has an intriguing conversation with the disciples. When Jesus tells them “This is the 
work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent” (Jn 6:29), they ask him: 
                                                
14 Powell, Fortress Introduction to the Gospels, 113. 
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“What signs are you going to give us then, so that we may se it and believe you? 
What work are you performing? Our ancestors ate the manna in the wilderness; as 
it is written ‘He gave them bread from heaven to eat.’” (Jn 6:30-31) 
 
The disciples are directly asking for signs, and Jesus responds saying “I am the bread of 
life,” (6:35) continuing with talk about how those who take part in him, take part in the 
Father, with whom he has an intimate connection. I find it significant that just after the 
feeding of the five thousand and the invocation of the sign of manna from heaven in the 
time of Moses that Jesus does not do another bread-related miracle, rather he talks about 
a strange mystical union and sharing that happens in receiving his flesh as bread.  
“Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide in me, and I in them. Just as 
the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so whoever eats me 
will live because of me.” (6:56-57) 
 
This kind of koinonia, or communion based in dwelling and flesh defies the logic of 
knowing, seeing, and signs. In fact the religious leaders, who, in the Gospel of John are 
associated with the Greco-Roman logic of the Empire to which they were bound, ask the 
very logical question “How can this man give us his flesh to eat?” (6:52). Thinking back 
to the beginning of the passage where we began, the episode starts out with a certain 
logical quest. The disciples ask what God wants – and Jesus responds with “belief.” In 
response the disciples ask for a sign, after all it seems to be a hallmark of the tradition 
they have been working with considering all the miracles and sign source material. The 
readers in the Johnnine community might have had that expectation themselves even, 
seeing as they would have been working within the tradition of the Gospel of Signs. But 
then Jesus responds not with a sign but this strange and “difficult” teaching (6:60) that is 
less about seeing a miracle or assenting to some sort of knowledge, but being drawn into 
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this mystical communion with the embodiment of God, drawn into an illogical, 
experiential koinonia, a mystical sharing of all things.  
 Yet even some of the sign source material that at first seems to clearly be about 
clear seeing and knowing, is complicated and turned on its head at particular moments by 
the Gospel writer. I find the story about the blind man who receives sight to be 
particularly compelling in this respect. While on the surface, it looks like it fits into the 
paradigms of seeing and knowing that mark the assumptions of the Gospel of Signs and 
Western philosophy alike, I find that there is something other than this stirring on the 
margins of the episode. The segment itself is a lengthy text, comprising the entirety of the 
ninth chapter of the Gospel. It begins with the very assumption that Derrida brings up in 
Memoirs of the Blind, that blindness is unnatural, a kind of violation or transgression, 
named in religious contexts as sin. The disciples suppose this premise ask the question of 
whose sin it was that caused the man’s blindness (Jn 9:2). Jesus rejects this notion, 
replying:  
“Neither this man nor is parents sinned; he was born blind so that God’s works 
might be revealed in him. We must work the works of him who sent me while it is 
day; night is coming when no one can work. As long as I am in the world, I am 
the light of the world.” (Jn 9:3-5) 
 
This response, while it rejects the paradigm of blindness as unnatural and sinful, still 
seems to fall into the kind of language of the sign source and Western thought—that this 
man’s condition of blindness is an opportunity to display for all to see and know the 
power of God, emphasized further by the imagery of Jesus as light, juxtaposed with the 
darkness. Yet this is just the opening of the drama, let’s see where the story ends up.  
 For as much as this episode seems to be a straightforward miracle or sign, meant 
to be seen and believed, there is a surprising undercurrent of unseeing and unknowing 
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that stirs in the unfolding events. After Jesus heals the man by spitting on the ground to 
make mud and telling him to go wash in the pool of Siloam, which he does, there is much 
confusion (9:6-7).  
The neighbors and those who had seen him before as a beggar began to ask, “Is 
this not the man who used to sit and beg?” Some were saying, “It is he.” Other 
were saying, “No, but it is someone like him.” He kept saying, “I am the man.” 
(9:8-9) 
 
Notice how even those who can see are uncertain; sight itself is fallible and the neighbors 
find themselves in the blindness of uncertainty. They were some of the closest witnesses 
to the miracle, yet they could not clearly see it. There was confusion and uncertainty even 
in such a sign! Notice also, the preoccupation of those who have sight with the certainty 
of knowing that they are lacking. 
But they kept asking him, “Then how were your eyes opened?” He answered, 
“The man called Jesus made mud, spread it on my eyes, and said to me, ‘Go to 
Siloam and Wash.’ Then I went and washed and received my sight.” Then they 
said to him, “Where is he?” He said, “I do not know.” (9:10-12) 
 
Interestingly enough, throughout the unfolding of the story the blind man who can now 
see is not the perfect model of enlightenment. He bears witness to the healing, to the 
event, marked by physical sight, yet there is still so much blindness and uncertainty that 
permeates his experience. I find it intriguing that he is explaining to those questioning 
him for clarity the details and logistics of the healing, yet when all this business of saliva 
and mud was happening, he could not actually see for himself clearly what was going 
on—he was still completely blind at that point! His witness is one of only later seeing, of 
touch, of experience, of feeling his eyes traced by the fingers of Jesus, an intimate 
encounter with a man who he did not actually see. All this feeling, bodily encounter, and 
tracing of fingers bring to mind the play of images in Derrida’s gloss on the blindness of 
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drawing, of hands moving out ahead of certainty, and of the mystical bodily communion 
that we just discussed with respect to John’s Jesus. After such an event as this, the result 
is not an enlightened being that enjoys clarity of sight and knowledge henceforth. Notice 
in the segment above the blind man’s outright statement “I do not know” when he is 
questioned about the whereabouts of Jesus (9:12). Such unknowingness is paralleled by 
the Pharisees, the religious leaders who seem in this story quite consumed with the 
anxiety of uncertainty. The parents of the man as well are perplexed and terrified by the 
interrogation of the logic-oriented caricature of temple leadership, adding to the chorus: 
“…we do not know how it is that now he sees, nor do we know who opened his eyes” 
(9:21, emphasis mine).  
 Finally, after some more disputes about knowing, Jesus, and the healing that took 
place, the previously blind man is driven out of town and Jesus seeks him out. Yet 
amazingly, the man who is the very character representative of receiving sight does not 
even recognize Jesus when he sees him (9:35-38)! The man is not suddenly all-seeing and 
all-knowing, he still lives in the blindness of human experience. The previously blind 
man can now see, but seeing does not involve knowing all the answers or even having 
total clarity of vision. Rather this man’s newfound sight involves speaking out of the 
obscurity of experience, out of memory, of wondering, not knowing, and believing 
amidst it all. Such a story doesn’t equate belief here to seeing and clarity, but rather is 
continually caught up in uncertainty and obscurity even after the miracle of sight. What 
Jesus says next however, directly upends assumptions of seeing and knowing.  
Jesus said, ‘I came into this world for judgment so that those who do not see may 
see, and those who do see may become blind.’ Some of the Pharisees near him 
heard this and said to him, ‘Surely we are not blind, are we?’ Jesus said to them, 
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‘If you were blind, you would not have sin. But now that you say, “We see”, your 
sin remains. (9:39-41) 
 
In a dramatic inverting of expectations, it is those who try to see clearly whom Jesus calls 
blind. Further, it is the one who lived out of physical blindness, who continues to live in 
the uncertainty of experience and belief, that sees. To pick up Caputo’s language of 
“crossing the wires”15, a biblical voice other than the sign source in Gospel of John 
disconnects the paradigm of “seeing” from the obsession with clarity and knowledge of 
the Greco-Roman-philosophic tradition that the sign source supports and hooks up 
instead to a certain unknowingness and experience in a story that is imbued with 
blindness. Sight in this story is not antithetical to blindness and unknowingness—it is 
pervaded by them.  
  Like the blind man who receives sight and like the fine artists who draw 
beautiful portraits, at first glance, photography is also assumed to be an artistic medium 
that turns entirely on the clarity, certitude, and knowledge of seeing. The camera acts 
almost as an extension of the eye, magnifying and hyper-aware, a tool used to capture, 
shoot, or take a photograph, as if it violently seizes all that one can with the capacity of 
sight, distilled in a moment. In fact, photography has a function entirely apart from art as 
evidence and documentation, viewed as a clear and static reproduction of factuality. Yet, 
just like the act of drawing and the story of the blind man, a closer look obscures all such 
assumptions. Our eyes are drawn to the edges, where blindness and uncertainty reside, 
often overlooked yet constantly, hauntingly lingering.  
 
                                                
15 John Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University 
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As an artist working in historic process photography, that is, photography done 
using historic methods rather than solely digital technology, I find that there is a great 
deal of blindness involved in making photographic images. In shooting photos with a film 
camera, one must close one eye, straining the other through a small window, to frame and 
focus the image. Fingers move along the dials, adjusting without always looking, 
measuring the light, making calculations but also taking a blind guess at how the 
photograph will look. Then with the press of a button, the finger invokes an event: the 
snap of a shutter, the moment of light entering the dark chamber inside the camera. A 
fraction of a second later, one is left with the trace of an image inscribed on the film. It is 
a trace hidden in the darkness, unable to be seen until one spends many hours in 
blindness, developing and printing the film in the obscurity of the darkroom.  
In this photographic process, there are cinders. Il y a là cindres. In all of the 
photographs that make up this exhibition, the images are made of cinders—the lingering 
trace of an event of burning. Unlike digital photography that records the incoming light 
into computer data organized by pixels, historic process photography depends upon the 
interaction between light and the physical material called emulsion, a silver-based 
chemical compound that is “light-sensitive.” When the light hits the emulsion, the 
interaction is one of burning. With respect to the film in the camera, when the shutter 
opens the places where the bright burns into the emulsion are dark and the spaces of dark 
shadow that block the light, remain light and transparent on the film—this creates the 
negative image on the film. When light is then projected through the negative in the 
darkroom onto a photographic paper also containing a surface layer of emulsion, the 
process is repeated. The light shines through the transparent spaces and is blocked by the 
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opaque darkness, the light burns into the paper, and the image is inverted into a positive 
print. The blindness, the squinting, darkness, obscurity, inversions, and burning all 
chaotically underlie the seeing of the image in the end. The photograph is not the all-
seeing light of certain knowledge but rather the cindery trace of that the light left behind, 
the smoldering ashes lingering after the event, a fragment, a glimpse, at what was, as it 
emerges from the chambers and darkness. My experience of making photographs has 
been as much characterized by blindness as it is has by sight.  
Turning to see the resulting images in Face to Face: Fragments 1-5 (5, 8-10, 21), 
you see that seeing the image is not so clear-cut. The clear glass here is the site of the 
cinders, not the stable paper or delineating matte and frame, but rather a transparent, 
floating image. You can only see the image if you also see through the image, beyond the 
image. The eye cannot fully stop at the surface; it must waver between the image on the 
glass and the space beyond. In such an interaction, the image changes, becomes more or 
less clear, as one walks around it. This sort of print would be a nightmare for Kant, as it is 
continually being infiltrated and contaminated by the surrounding context on which it 
entirely depends in order to be seen. It is caught in all the complex webs of meaning that 
context brings with it, not sheltered in aesthetic purity but recognized as participating in 
the constructs of meaning that we grasp in the flux of life. They float like ghosts, no 
longer stable entities but vague outlines that surprise and frighten us with all their 
uncertainty. They cannot even be seen apart from floating in space—if the glass was right 
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through it. Yet even floating at a distance, the shadows are still there. See? Its own image 
disseminates further, casting more shadows, a positive image that acts as a negative 
through which light continually burns… scattering ashes, lingering cinders carried off 
into the distance, cast across the walls, bounding faintly along the floor.  
What it is that one sees in these images? A face. Many faces. Eyes looking into 
our own eyes, questioning the seeing of sight itself. Faces that beacon us to face them—
here we find ourselves face to face. It is in such an evocative, mysterious encounter with 
the face that we return again to the question of the other, who in turn continues the 
questioning and probing of seeing. 
His [the other’s] presence consists in coming to unto us, making an entry. This 
can be stated in this way: the phenomenon which is the apparition of the other is 
also a face.16  
 
For Levinas, the face is the place of encounter with the other, the place in which the other 
most resists being reduced into sameness, assimilated into the brick wall. The face is 
everything that the ghostly mannequin standing out from the brick wall was lacking in 
The Other (2)—the signifier that overwhelms the cold structuralism with humanity and 
otherness. Levinas emphasizes that the otherness of the other as experienced in the face, 
goes even beyond the image of the face; it has both immanence and transcendence.17 
Notice how Levinas plays with both the manifestation and dissimulation of otherness that 
comes to bear on the surface of the face: 
Again to show this entry at every moment into the imminence and historicity of 
the phenomenon, we can say: the epiphany of the face is alive. Its life consists in 
undoing the form in which every entity, when it enters into immanence, that is, 
when it exposes itself as a theme, is already dissimulated. The other who  
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manifests himself in the face as it were breaks through his own plastic essence, 
like someone who opens a window on which his figure is outlined. His presence 
consists in divesting himself of the form which, however, manifests him. His 
manifestation is a surplus over the inevitable paralysis of manifestation. This is 
what the formula “the face speaks” expresses. The manifestation of a face is the 
first discourse. To speak is before all this way of coming from behind one’s 
appearance, behind one’s form—an opening in the openness.18 
 
I can’t help but hear the words of Derrida here: l’ouvre où ne pas voir, the open where 
not to see. The other’s face is an opening, but not one of seeing and all its confining 
assumptions of knowledge, control, and certainty. This opening of the face is seen by 
Levinas rather as a place of otherness, of the incoming of the transcendent, of both 
imminent signification and excess, of mystery and dissimulation. Face to Face: 
Fragments 1-5 (5, 8-10, 21) act similarly as a window, one that opens to experience the 
other yet traces the very limits of the form as the face, inviting an opening of that window 
on which it drawn, an opening to the otherness beyond. Levinas is continually playing 
between the face itself as a signifier and the otherness of the other that transcends it. For 
Levinas, the face of the other is not a text to be read but an encounter of seeing that goes 
beyond seeing, into a mystical space of otherness, excess, and undecidability.  
 Continuing to explore the confluence of modern and postmodern images with 
biblical thought, let us turn to a genuine Pauline text that also deals with seeing and the 
face of the other. Having heard two different voices in tension within the text of John—
dueling biblical voices in one instable piece of writing, a very Derridian notion—we turn 
to face another text that is up for debate. Let us turn an eye to two different readings of 
Paul’s well-known text about seeing face to face. 
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For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know 
only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known. And now 
faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love. (1 Cor 
13:12-13) 
 
The way I have heard this text most often read is a juxtaposition between many of the 
images we have looked at thus far—darkness and light, uncertainty and knowledge, 
obscurity and clarity, blindness and sight. In these comparisons, I continuously hear God 
associated with latter of each pair, and our poor human experience of the “now” being 
unfortunately characterized by the former. In this regard, face to face becomes an image 
of seeing and knowing, of an intimate encounter in which nothing is hidden or obscured. 
As opposed to seeing in a mirror, the typical interpretation of face to face is that it 
promises immediacy and presence, not a mere reflection. Let us take another look at this 
verse however, hoping that in being again drawn to the margins of the text, probing 
beyond the surface, something other might break in. In visiting the Greek text, I was 
struck by a word lost in translation. The word αἰνίγµατι, usually translated “dimly” or 
“darkly,” actually means “in an enigma.” In the resulting reading, “For now we see in a 
mirror, in an enigma,” I can’t help but see the French literary image to which Derrida 
often refers: a mise en abîme. This French phrase describes a puzzling visual image in 
which the image repeats itself infinitely. It is, in fact, the experience of standing between 
two mirrors, seeing the images play back and forth into an abyss, the abîme. In the 
installation of the exhibition The Open Where Not to See, I hung a mirror with a small 
mirror fragment hanging in front of it. Its label invites the viewer to line up the mirrors, 
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The mise en abîme can also happen without a mirror however, when the image 
repeats itself through a trick of the eye, repeating again and again into itself. Such an 
image is clearly—or perhaps not so clearly—an enigma as tricks and confuses our eye 
that is caught in its play, drawn unknowingly, unsettlingly into the abyss. Either way, 
such an image, while delightfully destablizing, still struggles against the repetition of 
sameness that carries it off beyond sight. Yet, the notion of face to face, which follows 
also a repetitive back-and forth dynamic, I envision not as clarity but the openness of 
otherness that breaks the bounds of confining, repetitive sameness. Turning again to 
Levinas’ notion of the face of the other, we see that coming face to face invokes a 
constant play between the interaction of signifiers, of the face’s physical immanence, and 
the otherness that continues to exceed it. The other is, after all, wholly other, tout autre 
est tout autre, as Derrida writes. The otherness of the other is the same total otherness 
that we ascribe to God, the very notion that informs our understanding, or lack thereof, of 
the divine. So moving from the visual puzzle of the mirror to standing face to face with 
another—be it God or any other—there is an experience of infinite otherness, of an event 
breaking the endless repetitions of sameness, that draws one into an openness and 
interactivity. For Levinas is speaking counter to all the systems of ethics that structure a 
response to the face of the other, and invites instead an interactivity that simply responds, 
breaking even consciousness. 
…a face is imposed on me without my being able to be deaf to its appeal nor to 
forget it, that is, without my being able to cease to be held responsible for its 
wretchedness. Consciousness loses its first place. … The epiphany of the 
absolutely other is a face in which the other calls to me and signifies an order to 
me by its nudity, its denuding…The I does not simply become conscious of this 
73 
 
necessity to answer, as if it were a matter of an obligation or a duty which it 
would have to decide of.19  
The faces haunt us. They confront and beckon us to respond. Faces work their way 
powerfully into memory. Yet face to face can stir up not only the notion of responding to 
the call of a stranger in need, to the humanity of others, but also evoke the notion of 
intimate encounters, bringing to mind the eros permeating Paul’s writings. The face is not 
only linked to the call of the other but also to desire.  
To desire is to burn with another fire than that of need which saturation puts out, 
to think beyond what one conceives. Because of this unassimilable surplus, this 
beyond, we have called the relationship which attaches the I to the other the idea 
of infinity.20 
 
Drawn into infinity, into the infinite experience of otherness between the I and the other, 
I cannot help but see the uncontainable abyssal opening to the otherness of God, one 
experiences the burning passion of the impossible. The event of divine in-breaking, the 
brush of otherness that breaks the confining repetition of sameness happens in all sorts of 
otherness. The point is not the identity of the other—be it a homeless blind man or God 
herself—but that the experience of every other, is one of the wholly other, of the divine. 
Tout autre est tout autre. Such otherness is manifest alike in the passing glance 
exchanged with the stranger, in the deep questioning stare of a lover, and in the 
passionate longing for future that is completely unimaginable. Such interaction, the back 
and forth seeing and being seen that happens in standing face to face, is so much deeper 
and complex than an enigma, yet opening and hopeful, filled with longing and desire. 
Only when I am at this point, the point of non-arrival, the place of wandering among the 
                                                
19 Ibid., 352-53. 
20 Ibid., 353. 
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cinders and traces released in the burning event, the feeling of continual longing for 
communion with the other who is simultaneously present yet withdrawn in mystery 
behind the façade, do I find that “faith, hope, and love abide” (1 Cor 13:13). For what is 
faith if there is nothing but certainty, no abyssal instability seemingly structured 
sameness and no passionate longing for a future, a promised communion that is anything 
but static? What is love if the otherness of the neighbor, the lover, the stranger, and God 
are all reduced and confined to the sameness of our expectations, subjected to 
disfigurement—defacement—of being put under systematic scrutiny of a systematic 
reading to extract certain knowledge and stability? Rather than a giving clarity of sight 
and stability of knowing, if coming face to face is a continual opening to the otherness, it 
becomes the very setting, a sort of khôral place, for faith, hope, and love to abide.  
 Still, the face is the site/sight of another otherness—that of tears. Derrida is quick 
to point this out, though he saves it for last, as have I. All the seeing and blindness, all the 
compelling expressiveness of the face, the nature of opening, come to bear in apparition 
of tears. For tears are an emotive opening, they not entirely active nor passive yet involve 
a certain imploring, longing, hoping, praying that brings to mind again the excerpt that 
Caputo holds as exemplifying the prayers and tears of Derrida: 
inviting calling promising 
hoping sighing dreaming, 
convoking invoking provoking21 
Tears are a longing prayer, an expression of raw vulnerability and openness. Interestingly 
enough, tears coming to the eyes veil their sight. Tears do not help one see clearly, in fact 
they obscure and avert one’s vision. Notice how the last of the Faces (9) is one of tears,  
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of eyes not looking ahead, but away, seeing only through the obscurity of tears welling 
up. Tears disrupt the function of vision; their deep act of opening and inviting is contrary 
to sight. Yet this is what Derrida claims to be the very character of the eye: not the clarity 
and knowledge of vision but the unknowing, vulnerable openness of tears. In evoking this  
final disruption of all of Western philosophy’s assumptions about eyes, from clarity of 
sight to the face of the other, Derrida turns to a poem by Andrew Marvell: 
How wisely Nature did decree, 
With the same eye to weep and see! 
That having viewed the object vain, 
We might be ready to complain 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Open then, mine eyes, your double sluice, 
And practice so your noblest use; 
For others too can see, or sleep, 
But only human eyes can weep. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Thus let your streams overflow your springs, 
Till eyes and tears be the same things. 
And each the other’s difference bears; 
These weeping eyes, those seeing tears.22 
Such poetics evoke a challenge to the notion of the eye as that which sees in reminding 
the reader that what makes human eyes human is their capacity to weep. Perhaps in the 
non-seeing of tears, in their tearing open, in their invitation and imploration, they reach 
something beyond what Western Philosophy seeks to grasp. These eyes that “viewed the 
object vain,” that faced the cracks stretching up the secure walls of structuralist thought, 
come to bear the difference experienced in the disjointed fractures of meaning and 
experience. Derrida references this poem as a final challenge to Western Philosophy’s 
obsession with clarity and knowledge associated with the eye. He does this using the very 
                                                
22 Memoirs of the Blind: The Self Portrait and Other Ruins, 128-29. 
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language of Western philosophy, truth, destiny, essence, nature but turning it on its 
head—suggesting that all these great terms suggesting ultimacy and structure find their 
locus not in the eye’s capacity for sight but its capacity for tears: 
Now if tears come to the eyes, if they well up in them, and if they can also veil 
sight, perhaps they reveal, in the very course of this experience, in the coursing of 
water, an essence of the eye, of man’s eye, in any case, the eye understood in the 
anthropo-theological space of the sacred allegory. Deep down, deep down inside, 
the eye would be destined not to see but to weep. For at the very moment they veil 
sight, tears would unveil what is proper to the eye… the truth of the eyes, whose 
ultimate destination they would thereby reveal: to have imploration rather than 
vision in sight, to address prayer, love, joy, or sadness rather than a look or a 
gaze.23 
 
On the verge of tears, I once again draw to the edge, the torn boundary—a tear. 
For tears welling up in the eyes feel not unlike a tearing open of something inside. The 
homophone renders a double entendre: tears and tears. It is this tear, this torn edge, does 
something, in its rending it reveals, disfigures, transforms, upends, and opens to 
something other. Drawn to this edge, this negative tear creates an opening, the broken 
boundary between a stable plane and the void beyond. Seeing through the eyes of these 
transparent faces, is some unchanging soul or stable entity, nor a map of character 
correlating to the signifiers of the surface of the face, but a tear, an edge and an opening. 
The very boundaries of the face, its image and form rendered in photographic art, is not 
the frame but the tear, the open space or void between the glass and the torn paper, the 
fragmented margins that refuse to enclose. Instead the boundaries are a place of the tear, 
of a wavering undecidability and openness. An open where not to see. A place of seeing 
through, seeing beyond, seeing without sight. A place of tears, of impassioned longing, 
praying, hoping, imploring for the tout autre, the wholly other. Viens! Oui, oui.  
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